Es gibt Eigenschaften, die in ihren empirischen Vorkommnissen gradativ sind, wie z.B. die Eigenschaften, etwas zu wissen und mächtig zu sein] d.h. man kann mehr oder weniger wissen, jemand ist mächtiger oder weniger mächtig als sein Gegenüber usw. usf. Dieser Aufsatz versucht Eigenschaftsexemplifikationen im Bereich von empirischen (Minima und) Maxima an Beispielen von Macht und Wissen dahingehend zu analysieren, ob sie tatsächlich dieselben Eigenschaften wie die durch Standardbeispiele aus dem "mittleren Bereich" definierten (Begriffe von) Eigenschaften betreffen. Es werden Argumente für (...) die Auffassung vorgelegt, im (Grenz-)Bereich der Minima und Maxima (wenigstens der Beispieleigenschaften) gebe es Fälle, wo es sich nicht (mehr) um dieselbe Eigenschaft handeln kann. Paradox formuliert: Es gibt Eigenschaften, deren Maxima (oder Minima) nicht mehr dieselbe Eigenschaft sind. (shrink)

Es gibt Eigenschaften, die in ihren empirischen Vorkommnissen gradativ sind, wie z.B. die Eigenschaften, etwas zu wissen und mächtig zu sein] d.h. man kann mehr oder weniger wissen, jemand ist mächtiger oder weniger mächtig als sein Gegenüber usw. usf. Dieser Aufsatz versucht Eigenschaftsexemplifikationen im Bereich von empirischen (Minima und) Maxima an Beispielen von Macht und Wissen dahingehend zu analysieren, ob sie tatsächlich dieselben Eigenschaften wie die durch Standardbeispiele aus dem "mittleren Bereich" definierten (Begriffe von) Eigenschaften betreffen. Es werden Argumente für (...) die Auffassung vorgelegt, im (Grenz-)Bereich der Minima und Maxima (wenigstens der Beispieleigenschaften) gebe es Fälle, wo es sich nicht (mehr) um dieselbe Eigenschaft handeln kann. Paradox formuliert: Es gibt Eigenschaften, deren Maxima (oder Minima) nicht mehr dieselbe Eigenschaft sind. (shrink)

Einführungs- und Übersichtsliteratur -- Zeittafel -- Personen- und Namenregister -- Sachregister sowie Liste griechischer und lateinischer Voces.

Übersetzt und mit Einfuhrung und Anmerkungen herausgegeben von Peter Kunze. Lateinisch-deutsch. (Philosophische Bibliothek, Nr. 401.) Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988. xlvii + 269 pp. 64 DM.

In addition to discussing some philosophical accounts of common sense, this article considers several ways in which common sense can be altered or disturbed in psychopathology. Common sense can be defined as practical understanding, capacity to see and take things in their right light, sound judgment, or ordinary mental capacity. The philosopher Vico described it as the ability to distinguish the probable from the improbable. Goethe understood common sense as an "organ" that is formed in communication for the purpose of (...) communication. Common sense is rooted in the intersubjective constitution of the life-world. Obsessive-compulsive patients show relatively mild disturbances of common sense. Patients with major affective psychoses, in their premorbid personality structure, are overly attached to common sense. In schizophrenia, however, there seems to be a true abdication of common sense involving a loss of "natural self-evidence." Even in premorbid states, such persons often lose both the sense of tact and the ability to "take things in their right light." Although logic, and the ability to engage in theoretical discussion, may be preserved, there is a loss of interpretive skills and the "faculty of judgment"; this results in an inability to cope with everyday practical and social activity. There is also a characteristic sense of perplexity, a sense of amazement before that which would normally seem self-evident and a frequent tendency to reflect upon the conditions of possibility of existence that otherwise remain concealed. The author suggests that the fragility of common sense should not be seen as a mere deficiency state. Rather, it derives from a basic vulnerability inherent in the very structure of being human. (Abstract written by special issue editor: L.A.S.). (shrink)

Cet article cherche à revenir sur la notion de beauté conçue comme « liberté des apparences » proposée par Schiller dans Callias ou de la beauté (1793), contre l’opposition de la pensée pré-moderne et moderne qui opposent de manière radicale la nature et la liberté. L’idée de Schiller que la beauté naturelle de la nature résulte de la liberté permet de résoudre cette opposition, comme le confirme la science moderne. L’article défend cette idée comme une manière souhaitable d’échapper aux cloisements (...) des modernes. (shrink)

Business ethics scholars have proposed strategies for mitigating the ill effects brought on by a wealth maximization business strategy by urging managers to either embrace corporate social responsibility (CSR) or to manage according to stakeholder theory. In this article I argue that these strategies are often ineffective in bringing about the behavior they promote because it is antithetical to the nature and logic of capitalism. I examine the organizing principles of capitalism and the role it assigns to capitalists, and juxtapose (...) these with the behavior prescribed by three normative frameworks: strategic management theory (SMT), the CSR initiative, and stakeholder theory. Unlike the behaviors prescribed by the CSR initiative and stakeholder management theory, the behavior prescribed by SMT is consistent with the role of capitalists as defined by the organizing principles of capitalism, and SMT's “rules” have instilled habits that have, in turn, been able to mold managers’ aspirations and purposes. CSR and stakeholder theory must not only combat the habits instilled by the entrenched SMT, they must also find some way of instilling habits that run contrary to those defined by the nature and logic of capitalism itself. (shrink)

The paper identifies some of the problems with legal systems and outlines the potential of AI technology for overcoming them. For expository purposes, this outline is based on a simplified epistemology of the primary functions of law. Social and philosophical impediments from the side of the legal community to taking advantage of the potential of this technology are discussed and strategic recommendations are given.

The future of work is forcing the world to adjust to a new paradigm of working. New skills will be required to create and adopt new technology and working methods. Additionally, cognitive skills, particularly creative problem-solving, will be highly sought after. The future of work paradigm has threatened many occupations but bolstered others such as engineering. Engineers must keep up to date with the technological and cognitive demands brought on by the future of work. Using an exploratory mixed-methods approach, our (...) study sought to make sense of how engineers understand and use creative problem solving. We found significant associations between engineers’ implicit knowledge of creativity, exemplified creative problem solving, and the perceived value of creativity. We considered that the work environment is a potential facilitator of creative problem-solving. We used an innovative exceptional cases analysis and found that the highest functioning engineers in terms of knowledge, skills, and perceived value of creativity, also reported working in places that facilitate psychosocially safe environments to support creativity. We propose a new theoretical framework for a creative environment by integrating the Four Ps and psychosocial safety climate theory that management could apply to facilitate creative problem solving. Through the acquisition of knowledge to engage in creative problem solving as individuals or a team, a perception of value must be present to enforce the benefit of creativity to the engineering role. The future of work paradigm requires that organisations provide an environment, a psychosocially safe climate, for engineers to grow and hone their sought-after skills that artificial technologies cannot currently replace. (shrink)

During psychotherapy, patient and therapist tend to spontaneously synchronize their vocal pitch, bodily movements, and even their physiological processes. In the present article, we consider how this pervasive phenomenon may shed new light on the therapeutic relationship– or alliance– and its role within psychotherapy. We first review clinical research on the alliance and the multidisciplinary area of interpersonal synchrony. We then integrate both literatures in the Interpersonal Synchrony (In-Sync) model of psychotherapy. According to the model, the alliance is grounded in (...) the coupling of patient and therapist’s brains. Because brains do not interact directly, movement synchrony may help to establish inter-brain coupling. Inter-brain coupling may provide patient and therapist with access to another’s internal states, which facilitates common understanding and emotional sharing. Over time, these interpersonal exchanges may improve patients’ emotion-regulatory capacities and related therapeutic outcomes. We discuss the empirical assessment of interpersonal synchrony and review preliminary research on synchrony in psychotherapy. Finally, we summarize our main conclusions and consider the broader implications of viewing psychotherapy as the product of two interacting brains. (shrink)

L-effect algebras are introduced as a class of L-algebras which specialize to all known generalizations of effect algebras with a \-semilattice structure. Moreover, L-effect algebras X arise in connection with quantum sets and Frobenius algebras. The translates of X in the self-similar closure S form a covering, and the structure of X is shown to be equivalent to the compatibility of overlapping translates. A second characterization represents an L-effect algebra in the spirit of closed categories. As an application, it is (...) proved that every lattice effect algebra is an interval in a right \-group, the structure group of the corresponding L-algebra. A block theory for generalized lattice effect algebras, and the existence of a generalized OML as the subalgebra of sharp elements are derived from this description. (shrink)

Maybe human aesthetics developed from animal aesthetics. I am not, of course, suggesting that sophisticated aesthetics as practiced by humans already exists among animals. Yet the aesthetic attitude as such might have originated in the animal kingdom. Drawing on this animal resource, human aesthetics might have evolved and, when cultural evolution emerged, it had reached results very different from animal aesthetics. With this perspective in mind, I show that the evolutionary aesthetics, as commonly pursued today, falls prey to serious shortcomings.